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Abstract—Sensors such as phasor measurement units (PMUs)
endowed with GPS receivers are ubiquitously installed providing
real-time grid visibility. A number of PMUs can cooperatively
enable state estimation routines. However, GPS spoofing attacks
can notably alter the PMU measurements, mislead the network
operator, and drastically impact subsequent corrective control
actions. Leveraging a novel measurement model that explicitly
accounts for the GPS spoofing attacks, this paper formulates
an optimization problem to identify the most vulnerable PMUs
in the network. A greedy algorithm is developed to solve the
aforementioned problem. Furthermore, the paper develops a
computationally efficient alternating minimization algorithm for
joint state estimation and attack reconstruction. Numerical tests
on IEEE benchmark networks validate the developed methods.
Index Terms—GPS spoofing, PMU, State Estimation, Time
Synchronization Attack, Weighted Least Squares.
NOMENCLATURE
Nb Number of buses
Nl Number of transmission lines
Ln Number of lines connected to bus n
Nn Set of buses connected to bus n
NPMU Set of buses with PMUs installations
Np Number of PMUs attacked
a Binary vector of PMU locations in a network
b Binary vector of attacked PMUs
Hn Regression matrix for bus n
wn Noise vector at bus n
Σn Noise covariance for the measurement at bus n
Vn Voltage phasor at bus n
Vn,r, Vn,i Real and imaginary parts of Vn
|Vn|, θn Magnitude and angle of Vn
vr Vector collecting Vn,r for all buses
vi Vector collecting Vn,i for all buses
v Vector [vr> vi>]>
Ink Current phasor on line (n, k)
|Ink|, θInk Magnitude and angle of Ink
vˆML Maximum likelihood (ML) estimate of system
state
ztruen Noiseless measurement at bus n
zatkn Noisy attacked measurement at bus n
vˆatkML ML state estimate using attacked measurements
µatkML Expected value of vˆ
atk
ML
BML Bias-scaling matrix induced by attack
∆θn Attack angle at bus n
∆θ Vector collecting ∆θn for all buses
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Γn Block diagonal matrix relating ztruen and z
atk
n
γn Vector
[
cos(∆θn) sin(∆θn)
]>
I. INTRODUCTION
PHASOR Measurement Units (PMUs) equipped with GPSreceivers are installed ubiquitously in smart grids, re-
placing and augmenting traditional sensors of the Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. The higher
sampling rates of PMUs compared to SCADA systems assist
the network operator to perform real time Wide Area Moni-
toring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC)—a unique feature
of smarter power grids.
Cyber attacks on PMUs include False Data Injection (FDI)
attacks and GPS spoofing attacks. In an FDI attack, the
attacker tries to inject false data that are not detectable by
bad data detection algorithms into the network; see e.g., the
recent works [1], [2]. GPS spoofing is caused by transmitters
mimicking the GPS signal with the intention of altering the
GPS time estimated by the PMU’s GPS receiver [3], [4]. These
attacks maliciously introduce erroneous time stamps, thereby
inducing a wrong phase angle in the PMU measurements [5],
and are also called time synchronization attacks (TSAs).
The Electric Power Research Institute, in collaboration
with the National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization
Resource, has published a technical report recognizing the
vulnerability of PMUs to GPS spoofing under its scenario
WAMPAC.12: GPS Time Signal Compromise [6]. This paper
considers the effects of GPS spoofing attacks on power grids.
Sensors such as PMUs cannot be placed at every bus
location in the power network as they are still costly. Thus
they are placed in crucial network locations to ensure the
visibility of the network. Consequently, a system operator
can generate information about other, non-sensed states using
state estimation (SE) routines [7]–[10]. The purpose of SE
is three-fold: protection, operational control, and grid status
verification [9]. In a network, measurements from dispersed
PMUs are time synchronized at the Phasor Data Concentrator
(PDC) and fed to the super PDC for further processing. Thus,
systematic attacks on PMUs can have a catastrophic effect on
the SE and consequently on the grid.
This paper analyzes the vulnerability of smart grids to GPS
spoofing by formulating an optimization problem to identify
vulnerable PMUs in the network, and by developing an
algorithm for joint state estimation and attack reconstruction.
The ensuing section provides a review of the related literature,
and details the contributions of this paper.
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2II. LITERATURE REVIEW & PAPER CONTRIBUTIONS
This section categorizes the GPS spoofing attack literature
in three groups, namely, the feasibility of spoofing attacks,
impacts to the power grid, and countermeasures, and details
the contributions of this paper.
The experimental and theoretical feasibility of GPS
spoofing attacks is shown in [11]–[15]. More specifically, [11]
demonstrates the implementation of a laboratory-based GPS
spoofer and discusses mechanisms against civilian GPS spoof-
ing. A spoofer implemented in US DOE’s Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory is the theme of [12]. The vulnerabilities
of PMUs to GPS spoofing are studied in [13] and [14]. The
work in [15] manipulates the GPS navigation data to achieve
various timing and phase errors in PMU measurements.
The impacts of GPS spoofing attacks on system operations
are studied in [13], [15], [16]. Specifically, the effect of GPS
spoofing on fault location and voltage stability monitoring
algorithm is demonstrated in [15] and [16]. A falsely activated
generator trip scenario—as a result of a GPS spoofing attack—
is constructed in [13]. In our previous work [17], the statistics
of state estimates affected by GPS spoofing are studied.
Countermeasures to spoofing attacks are discussed in [18]–
[23]. A detection method for TSAs on multiple PMUs using a
cross layer detection mechanism is developed in [18]. The
work in [19] presents a method to detect hazardous data
via signal-based and model-based methods. Furthermore, a
GPS spoofing attack detection scheme based on collabora-
tion among multiple PMUs in a large grid is the theme of
[20]. Recommendations for improving spoofing detection in
commercial receivers are articulated in [21]. The work in [22]
takes advantage of the PMU locations along with the statistics
of GPS receivers to detect the spoofing attacks. The work in
[23] proposes methods to prevent propagation of cyber-attacks
in PMU networks.
State estimation and GPS spoofing attack identification in
power networks is pursued in [24], [25]. A computationally
efficient algorithm to identify an attack on at most one PMU
is developed in [24]. The generalized likelihood ratio test
(GLRT) is the basis of the method developed in [25], but
implementation of GLRT requires the solution of a hard
optimization problem with respect to the unknown time delay
induced by GPS spoofing. Beyond the two aforementioned
works, which specialize in GPS spoofing, recent works that
deal with attack identification in power networks include [2],
[26]–[28]. The majority of these studies require successive
measurements across time and detailed dynamical models of
the network, including generator parameters. The contributions
of this paper are as follows.
• A measurement model that explicitly relates the PMU
measurements with the network state and the (potential)
GPS spoofing-induced phase shifts is developed. This
model is leveraged to derive the statistics of the state
estimator when GPS-spoofed PMU measurements are
utilized.
• A novel greedy algorithm to identify the most vulnerable
PMU locations is developed. The vulnerability is quanti-
fied by the state estimation error, which is characterized
explicitly in terms of the spoofing attack. Exhaustive
search is used to validate the performance of the greedy
algorithm. Our analysis is intended to guide the system
operator towards increased protection of the network’s
most vulnerable PMU locations.
• An algorithm to jointly perform state estimation and
attack angle reconstruction is developed. The algorithm
is based on alternating minimization of a bilinear least
squares objective. Lagrangian duality is leveraged so
that—despite the nonconvexity—the algorithm features
closed-form updates. This property renders the algorithm
attractive for real-time implementation.
• The algorithm is extended to state estimation and attack
identification using combined SCADA and GPS-spoofed
PMU measurements.
Numerical tests indicate that the alternating minimization
algorithm can yield smaller state estimation error than the
largest normalized residual test (LNRT), which is a classical
method for bad data identification [29, Sec. 4.8.4]. The algo-
rithm is also compared to one of the previous GPS spoofing
identification approaches [24]. The developed algorithm can
identify simultaneous attacks to more than one PMU, in
contrast to [24]. Even if 20% of the PMUs are attacked,
the algorithm correctly identifies the attacked PMU locations
and yields an accurate state estimate, as indicated by tests on
standard IEEE transmission networks.
In comparison with [25], this work does not necessitate the
solution of a complicated optimization problem with respect to
the induced phase shift. The state estimation algorithm is based
on a new measurement model that explicitly relates the PMU
measurements with the attacked phases, which is different than
the additive attack model of [2], [26]–[28]. The implication
is that the developed algorithm does not require successive
measurements across time, and is also able to identify the
spoofing-induced attacked phases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion III reviews the PMU-based SE. Section IV formulates an
optimization problem to identify the most vulnerable PMUs
in the network. An algorithm for joint state estimation and
attack reconstruction is developed in Section V. Extensions to
SE with PMU and SCADA measurements are discussed in VI.
Numerical tests on standard IEEE networks are performed in
Section VII, and Section VIII concludes the paper.
III. PMU-BASED STATE ESTIMATION
This section outlines the network and measurement model,
with and without TSAs, and provides the optimal state esti-
mators using PMU measurements without TSAs.
A. Network Model and PMU Measurements
Consider a power network with Nb buses connected via Nl
transmission lines. Let Nn be the set of buses connected to
bus n, and define Ln = |Nn| as the number of lines connected
to bus n. The system state is the vector of nodal voltages
in rectangular coordinates denoted by v = [vr> vi>]> ∈
R2Nb×1 where vr and vi collect the real and imaginary parts
Vn,r and Vn,i of the complex voltages at buses n = 1, . . . , Nb.
3PMUs are installed on select buses of the network; an is a
binary indicator is equal to 1 if a PMU is installed at bus n
and 0 otherwise. Vector a collects an for n = 1, 2, . . . , Nb.
The set of buses where PMUs are installed is denoted by
NPMU = {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nb}|ai = 1}. A PMU installed at
bus n measures the bus’s complex voltage as well as the
complex currents on all lines that bus n is connected to. This
collection of measured quantities (in rectangular coordinates)
at bus n is concatenated in a vector zn ∈ R2+2Ln . To make the
notation more compact, define Mn = 2 + 2Ln as the number
of distinct real quantities measured by the PMU at bus n.
Let Vn and Ink generically denote the voltage and current
phasors at bus n and line (n, k) respectively; and let θn and
θInk denote the corresponding phasor angles. It is convenient
for subsequent developments to consider the noiseless version
of zn, which is denoted by ztruen ∈ RMn :
ztruen =

Vn,r
Vn,i
{Ink,r}k∈Nn
{Ink,i}k∈Nn
 =

|Vn| cos(θn)
|Vn| sin(θn)
{|Ink| cos(θInk)}k∈Nn
{|Ink| sin(θInk)}k∈Nn
 (1)
where Ink,r and Ink,i are the real and imaginary parts of
the complex current injected into line (n, k). Note that the
current injected into line (n, k) is different than the current
injected into line (k, n). To summarize, the noiseless quantities
measured at bus n ∈ NPMU comprise the real and imaginary
parts of the nodal complex voltage, appended by the real and
imaginary parts of the complex currents injected to all lines
connected to bus n. Using the bus admittance matrix of the
network, ztruen can be written as a linear function of the system
state v as ztruen = Hnv. The construction of Hn ∈ RMn×2Nb
is provided in [17], [30]. In practice, a PMU at bus n measures
zn, which is a noisy version of ztruen , i.e.,
zn = z
true
n + wn = Hnv + wn
where wn ∼ N (0,Σn) represents an additive Gaussian noise
vector that is assumed independent across PMUs and has a
known positive definite covariance Σn.
Given that the likelihood of the measurement
p
({zn}Nbn=1; v) = ∏Nbn=1 p(zn; v)an is Gaussian, the maximum
likelihood (ML) estimate of the system state is given as
vˆML = argmin
v
Nb∑
n=1
an(zn −Hnv)>Σ−1n (zn −Hnv). (2)
The optimization in (2) amounts to unconstrained least
squares, and can be solved by taking the gradient of the cost
function with respect to v and setting it to zero, resulting in
vˆML = G
−1
Nb∑
n=1
anH
>
nΣ
−1
n zn (3)
where it is assumed that the matrix G =
∑Nb
n=1 anH
>
nΣ
−1
n Hn
is non-singular. Invertibility of G is tantamount to the state
observability, which can be ensured when there is a sufficient
number of installed PMUs in the network [30].
Substituting zn = Hnv + wn into (3) yields the statistics
of the estimator as vˆML ∼ N (v,G−1). That is, the expected
value of the estimate is the system state v, or in other
TABLE I
GPS-SPOOFING INDUCED PHASE ANGLE ERROR
Reference Phase angle error
[15] 52◦
[13] 70◦
[16] ±60◦
words the estimator is unbiased. The next section develops
a relationship between the measured quantities of bus n when
there is TSA and their version in the absence of an attack.
B. TSA-Impacted PMU Measurement Model
As mentioned in [16], TSA affects only the phase of the
measurement. Specifically, a TSA on bus n introduces a clock
offset error ∆tn [16]. The phase angle error corresponding to
the clock offset error for the PMU at bus n is denoted by ∆θn
and is given by ∆θn = 2pif∆tn[rad] = 360f∆tn[degrees]
where f = 60 Hz. Table I lists typical phase angle errors
caused by GPS spoofing attacks reported in the literature.
The noisy attacked PMU measurement at bus n is given by
zatkn =

|Vn| cos(θn + ∆θn)
|Vn| sin(θn + ∆θn)
{|Ink| cos(θInk + ∆θn)}k∈Nn
{|Ink| sin(θInk + ∆θn)}k∈Nn
+ wn (4)
Note that there is a potentially different ∆θn per bus n.
Combining (4) with (1) and introducing ztruen = Hnv, a linear
relationship between zatkn and z
true
n can be derived as:
zatkn = Γnz
true
n + wn = ΓnHnv + wn (5)
where Γn ∈ RMn×Mn is a block diagonal matrix1 consisting
of 1 + Ln blocks and each block is the 2 × 2 matrix[
cos ∆θn − sin ∆θn
sin ∆θn cos ∆θn
]
. Therefore, ztruen can be thought of as
the noiseless measurement that would be available to the
PMU-enabled bus n in the absence of a spoofing attack.
The measurement model in (5) connects the state with the
attack. It is worth noticing that the measurement is linear in
the state, but nonlinear in the attack angle. In Section IV,
we use the measurement model (5) to develop a framework
which identifies the most vulnerable PMU locations in the
network. In Section V, the model in (5) is leveraged to jointly
perform the state estimation and attack angle reconstruction
from spoofed PMU measurements.
IV. IDENTIFYING SUSCEPTIBLE PMU LOCATIONS
This section formulates an optimization problem to identify
the most vulnerable PMUs in the network and develops a
computationally attractive solution algorithm. To this end, the
statistics of the ML state estimate obtained from the corrupted
measurement (5) are characterized next.
1Note that Γn depends on ∆θn, but this dependency is kept implicit in
order to keep the notations compact. When ∆θn = 0 (no attack), we obtain
the identity matrix, Γn = IMn .
4A. Statistics of the Estimates Under Attack
The worst-case scenario is considered, whereby the SE
routine does not know (or has not detected) that an attack
has occurred. Under this scenario, the SE routine passes the
corrupted measurement (5) through the estimator (3). Thus,
the state estimate after the attack is given by
vˆatkML = G
−1
Nb∑
n=1
anH
>
nΣ
−1
n z
atk
n . (6)
It should be emphasized that (6) is not the ML estimate that
the SE module would derive if the attack magnitude ∆θn were
known. With this observation, we refer to (6) as the attacked
ML estimator. In what follows, we derive the statistics of the
estimates under attack.
Theorem 1: The attacked ML estimator has the Gaussian
distribution vˆatkML ∼ N (µatkML,G−1), i.e., it has covariance G−1
and expected value
µatkML = G
−1
Nb∑
n=1
anH
>
nΣ
−1
n ΓnHnv. (7)
Proof: Substituting (5) into (6) yields
E[vˆatkML] = E
[
G−1
(
Nb∑
n=1
anH
>
nΣ
−1
n (ΓnHnv + wn)
)]
= E
[
G−1
Nb∑
n=1
anH
>
nΣ
−1
n ΓnHnv
]
which proves (7). Using the definition of covariance and the
fact that E[wnw>n ] = Σn, it follows that
cov[vˆatkML] = E[(vˆ
atk
ML − E[vˆatkML])(vˆatkML − E[vˆatkML])>]
= G−1
(
Nb∑
n=1
a2nH
>
nΣ
−1
n E[wnw
>
n ]Σ
−1
n Hn
)
(G−1)>
which verifies that cov[vˆatkML] = G
−1.
Having derived the distribution of the attacked estimate, the
next section details how estimation accuracy metrics typically
employed in power systems are affected by the attack.
B. SE Accuracy Metrics
For any estimator vˆ, the mean square error (MSE) matrix
is a metric of the estimation accuracy which is introduced in
the power systems as early as the seminal work in [31] and
has traditionally been utilized in the statistical literature [32].
Definition 1: With v denoting the true system state, the
mean square error (MSE) matrix is defined by
MSEM(vˆ) = E
[
(vˆ − v)(vˆ − v)>] . (8)
The MSE matrix is formed by the pairwise nodal voltage
estimate errors. Its diagonal entries characterize the accuracy
of individual nodal voltage estimates. Based on the MSE
matrix, it is customary to obtain a scalar metric of the SE
accuracy as follows.
Definition 2: The mean square error of an estimator is
defined as the trace of the MSE matrix:
MSE(vˆ) = trace[MSEM(vˆ)] = E
[
(vˆ − v)>(vˆ − v)] . (9)
The MSE sums the squared errors of nodal voltage estimates.
The last equality in (9) follows immediately from the linearity
of the expectation. The MSE matrix and the MSE are formu-
lated by squaring the difference between the estimate and its
true value. This difference yields a bias metric as follows.
Definition 3: The bias of an estimator is defined as
Bias(vˆ) = E[vˆ − v] = E[vˆ]− v. (10)
Theorem 1 reveals that GPS spoofing introduces a bias in
the ML estimator, and is given by Bias(vˆatkML) = µ
atk
ML − v =
BML(∆θ)v where ∆θ = [∆θ1, . . . ,∆θNb ]
T and
BML(∆θ) = G
−1∑Nb
n=1
anH
>
nΣ
−1
n Γn(∆θ)Hn − I. (11)
The matrix BML(∆θ) analytically characterizes the effect of
the attacked PMU phase shift to the estimation bias. The ideal
scenario for the bias is to be zero, which occurs in the absence
of an attack, yielding ∆θ = 0 and BML(∆θ) = 0.
The next theorem precisely characterizes the relationship
between the MSE and the bias.
Theorem 2: The MSE and the bias of the attacked state
estimate vˆatkML satisfy the following relationship:
MSE
(
vˆatkML
)
= trace
[
G−1
]
+
∥∥Bias (vˆatkML)∥∥22 . (12)
Proof: By adding and subtracting µatkML (cf. Theorem 1)
from the term (vˆ − v) we obtain:
MSE
(
vˆatkML
)
=
E
[
(vˆ − µatkML + µatkML − v)>(vˆ − µatkML + µatkML − v)
]
=
E
[
(vˆ − µatkML)>(vˆ − µatkML)
]
+ (µatkML − v)>(µatkML − v)
+ 2E
[
(vˆ − µatkML)>(µatkML − v)
]
. (13)
The first term in (13) is the trace of the covariance matrix
cov[vˆatkML] (cf. Theorem 1). The second term is equal to∥∥Bias (vˆatkML)∥∥22. Expanding the third term reveals that it is
zero. Therefore, (12) follows.
The theorem states that as the norm of the bias increases, the
MSE increases and vice versa. Recall that G depends only on
the network topology and the location of the installed PMUs.
Power system protection, control, and status verification are
all contingent upon the availability of accurate state estimates.
For example, voltage stability assessment (VSA) computes
the load change that a system can tolerate before voltage
collapse occurs. To perform VSA, the current operating point
is obtained from the state estimator [33], and thus corrupted
state estimates can have significant impact on the power grid
security. It is worth emphasizing that even if a very small
number of PMUs are attacked, the estimated voltages at all
buses are affected. By leveraging the previously defined SE
accuracy metrics, the next section studies how the location
and angles of the attacked PMUs affect the quality of the
state estimates.
Remark 1: Apart from the MSE and bias, which are general
metrics of the SE accuracy, additional indices are used for
evaluating the severity of contingencies [34] based on the
current network state. Since GPS spoofing disturbs the SE, it
also affects the computation of contingency severity indices.
The methodology in Sections IV-C and IV-D can also be
applied to these indices.
5C. The Most Vulnerable PMU Location
The objective of this section is to furnish the system
operator with an analytical tool to study how the SE accuracy
is affected by different attack combinations, and identify the
PMUs that can induce the largest bias or MSE if attacked.
Theorem 2 reveals that the MSE and the squared norm of the
bias are related via an additive constant. Therefore, any of the
two metrics can be used to study the effects that the spoofing
attacks have on the SE accuracy. An optimization problem to
find the attack angle combinations that maximize the norm of
the bias is formulated in the sequel.
Specifically, the optimization variables are b ∈ {0, 1}Nb ,
which denotes the vector of attacked PMUs, and the attack
angles ∆θ. The optimization problem to maximize the bias,
solved by the network operator, is stated next, where Np be
the number of PMUs attacked and an upper bound ∆θmax on
the attack angle is considered to potentially account for the
attacker’s limited capability to shift the phasor angle:2
maximize
∆θ, b
||BML(∆θ)v||2 (14a)
subject to −∆θmax  b ∆θ ∆θmax  b, (14b)
b ∈ {0, 1}Nb , b  a, (14c)
Nb∑
i=1
bi = Np (14d)
where  represents entry-wise multiplication.
The two optimization variables in (14) are ∆θ and b.
Constraint (14b) imposes bounds on ∆θ that account for
the maximum phase shift induced by the attack. The bounds
∆θmax can be set empirically based on studies such as the
ones listed in Table II. Constraint (14c) expresses the binary
nature of b and represents that an attack can only happen
on buses where PMUs are installed. The number of PMUs
attacked in the network is captured via constraint (14d). The
value of Np is realistically set to a small number, because it
is unlikely that multiple GPS spoofers simultaneously attack
at different geographical locations.
Problem (14) is a mixed integer program due to the binary
b and thus hard to solve. Furthermore, even if the binary
variables are relaxed to intervals 0 ≤ bi ≤ 1, the resulting
problem is still nonconvex due to presence of sinusoids in the
objective function.
Optimization problem (14) yields the bus locations that
if attacked induce the largest bias. The inputs are a, v,
Np, and ∆θmax. The vector a represents the buses with
installed PMUs. It is worth emphasizing that optimization
problem (14) is solved by the system operator, with the
purpose of identifying the attacks that can potentially cause
the maximum deviation of the state estimate from its true
value. Optimization problem (14) depends on the voltage
profile v. The voltage profile is typically determined as a
result of an optimal power flow routine, which considers
the network demand and optimizes economical objectives,
subject to reliability constraints (such as line thermal limits).
The system operator can thus solve (14) for different voltage
2For vectors x,y ∈ RN , notation x  y means xi ≤ yi, i = 1, . . . , N .
Algorithm 1: Optimal Algorithm to identify the Np most
vulnerable PMU locations
Input: a,v,∆θmax, and Np
Obtain the combinations c =
(
|NPMU|
Np
)
—each
combination corresponds to a specific b
for i = 1 : c do
Solve (15) using three initializations: ∆θinit = 0,
∆θinit = −∆θmax  b, ∆θinit = ∆θmax  b
Record the largest objective value resulting from the
three initializations and the corresponding ∆θ
end
Find the largest among the c recorded values. The
corresponding vectors b and ∆θ are the solution to
(14).
Algorithm 2: Greedy Algorithm to identify Np = 2 most
vulnerable PMU locations
Input: a,v,∆θmax; worst PMU location and attack (n1,
∆θ∗n1 ) from Algorithm 1 with Np = 1
for i = 1 : Nb do
if ai = 1 and i 6= n1 then
bi = 1, bn1 = 1, bj = 0 ∀ j 6= {i, n1};
Solve (15) with constraint ∆θn1 = ∆θ
∗
n1 and
initializations ∆θi ∈ {0,−∆θimax,∆θimax}
Choose ∆θ∗ corresponding to the largest
objective value and obtain ||BML(∆θ∗)v||2
Reset bi = 0
end
end
The second most vulnerable PMU location corresponds
to the largest recorded ||BML(∆θ∗)v||2
profiles v, as the nodal injections and loads vary. Section IV-D
details the solution approach for (14).
D. Solution Approach
Problem (14) can be optimally solved by enumerating all
possible combinations of vector b satisfying constraints (14c)
and (14d), and solving for each vector b the following
optimization problem with variable ∆θ:
maximize
∆θ
||BML(∆θ)v||2
subject to −∆θmax  b ∆θ ∆θmax  b
(15)
Recall that the bias BML(∆θ)v is a nonconvex function
of ∆θ. We use MATLAB’s nonlinear programming solver
fmincon [35] to find a local maximum of (15). As the
solution depends on the initial point, it is better to solve (15)
for multiple initializations. The solution of (14) is given by b
and ∆θ resulting in the largest objective value for (15). The
optimal procedure to solve (14) is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 uses exhaustive search. It thus has substantial
complexity for large networks especially when Np ≥ 2,
because it considers all combinations of Np PMUs. An alter-
native approach is to use a greedy algorithm. Consider the case
of Np = 2. The main idea is to use Algorithm 1 with Np = 1
6to identify the single most vulnerable PMU and corresponding
attack angle, then fix the attack angle on that bus and search
for a second PMU bus and attack angle.
Specifically, first Algorithm 1 is run with Np = 1. Let n1
be the resulting bus index, that is b∗n1 = 1, and let ∆θ
∗
n1 be
the corresponding optimal attack angle. The second step is to
solve problem (14) with Np = 2 and additional constraints
bn1 = 1 and ∆θn1 = ∆θ
∗
n1 . This approach effectively reduces
the problem of considering all combinations of Np = 2 PMUs
into two searches of Np = 1 PMU, which are much simpler.
Algorithm 2 summarizes the steps of the greedy approach. The
idea can be extended to larger values of Np. For example,
if Np = 3, Algorithm 2 can be applied to find the first
two most vulnerable PMUs (denote them as n1 and n2 with
corresponding angles ∆θ∗n1 and ∆θ
∗
n2 ). Then, problem (14)
with Np = 3 and additional constraints bn1 = 1, bn2 = 1,
∆θn1 = ∆θ
∗
n1 , and ∆θn2 = ∆θ
∗
n2 is solved.
The chief reason why Algorithm 2 has potential for compu-
tational effectiveness relative to Algorithm 1 is the complexity
of the nonconvex optimization problem (15) that needs to be
solved in every iteration of these algorithms. In particular,
problem (15) always has one optimization variable for all
cases that needs to be solved as Algorithm 2 runs. In contrast,
problem (15) always has Np optimization variables for all
cases that needs to be solved as Algorithm 1 runs. Taking
advantage of the fact that highly efficient algorithms exist for
one-dimensional minimization, the reduction in the number of
optimization variables plays a significant role.
V. STATE ESTIMATION AND ATTACK RECONSTRUCION
This section develops an algorithm to jointly estimate the
system state and identify the phase shifts for attacked buses.
The network operator has access to the measurement vectors
zatkn at all buses on which PMUs are installed. Using the model
in (5), the problem of jointly estimating v and ∆θn amounts
to the following nonlinear least squares problem with variables
v and {∆θn}n∈NPMU , where for clarity, the dependency of Γn
on ∆θn is denoted explicitly:
min
v,∆θ
Nb∑
n=1
an(z
atk
n −Γn(∆θn)Hnv)>Σ−1n (zatkn −Γn(∆θn)Hnv).
(16)
The previous problem is nonlinear due to the trigonometric
functions present in the definition of Γn(∆θn) (cf. Sec-
tion III-B). To alleviate this nonlinearity, we change the
variable ∆θn by introducing a new optimization variable γn =[ γn,1
γn,2
]
=
[
cos(∆θn)
sin(∆θn)
]
. In order to be able to uniquely recover
∆θn, the constraint γ2n,1 + γ
2
n,2 = 1 is added. The resulting
problem is a constrained bilinear least squares problem with
optimization variables v and {γn}n∈NPMU :
minimize
v,{γn}n∈NPMU
Nb∑
n=1
f(γn,v) (17a)
subject to γ>n γn = 1, n ∈ NPMU, (17b)
where the objective function f(γn,v) is written as
f(γn,v) = an(z
atk
n − ΓnHnv)>Σ−1n (zatkn − ΓnHnv)
and Γn is a block diagonal matrix that includes 2× 2 blocks
of the term
[
γn,1 −γn,2
γn,2 γn,1
]
; the variables γn and Γn are used
interchangeably.
Problem (17) is nonconvex and thus challenging. The
nonconvexity arises because the objective is bilinear in the
variables v and γn and also because of the quadratic equality
constraint (17b). But problem (17) can be efficiently tackled
via an alternating minimization (AM) algorithm as explained
in the sequel.
In general, the AM algorithm is applicable to minimization
with respect to two groups of variables, in this case v and
{γn}n∈NPMU . In the first step, minimization with respect to
the first group is performed, by assuming the second group
is kept fixed. The second step consists of minimization with
respect to the second group of variables upon substituting the
updated values for the first group of variables. These two steps
are repeated until convergence. The convergence criterion is
|CurrObj − PrevObj|/|CurrObj| ≤ Tolerance (), where
PrevObj and CurrObj represent the objective function
values (17a) before and after the update. The algorithm is
initialized by setting γn =
[
1 0
]>
for all n ∈ NPMU.
The AM algorithm has the attractive feature that it decreases
the objective (17a) in every iteration. Interestingly, the mini-
mizations in this algorithm can be solved in closed form, as
shown next.
A. Minimization With Respect to the State
The minimization of (17) with respect to v amounts to
unconstrained least squares with solution
vˆAM = G
−1
AM
Nb∑
n=1
an(ΓnHn)
>Σ−1n z
atk
n (18)
where it is assumed that the matrix GAM =∑Nb
n=1 an(ΓnHn)
>Σ−1n (ΓnHn) is non-singular.
B. Minimization With Respect to the Attack Angle
The minimization in (17) with respect to γn takes the
following equivalent form:
minimize
γn
(zatkn −Anγn)>Σ−1n (zatkn −Anγn) (19a)
subject to γ>n γn = 1 (19b)
where h>n,i is the i-th row of Hn (i = 1, 2, . . . ,Mn) and
An ∈ RMn×2 is defined as
An =

h>n,1v −h>n,2v
h>n,2v h
>
n,1v
...
...
h>n,Mn−1v −h>n,Mnv
h>n,Mnv h
>
n,Mn−1v
 . (20)
Problem (19) is nonconvex due to the quadratic equality
constraint (19b). Interestingly, it is possible to solve this
problem in closed form. To facilitate the solution, consider
the eigenvalue decomposition (EVD) of A>nΣ
−1
n An given as
A>nΣ
−1
n An = QΞQ
>, where Q ∈ R2×2 is orthonormal
7and Ξ ∈ R2×2 is a diagonal matrix of non-negative eigen-
values ξ1 and ξ2. Define further un = Q>A>nΣ
−1
n z
atk
n =[
un,1 un,2
]>
. Notice that Q and un are readily obtained
with knowledge of the current iterate v and the measurement
zatkn . The next theorem characterizes the solution to (19).
Theorem 3: The minimizer of (19) is given by
γn = (A
>
nΣ
−1
n An + λnI)
−1A>nΣ
−1
n z
atk
n , (21)
where λn is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to (19b)
and is a root of the following quartic equation in λn which
has at least one real solution:
g(λn) =
u2n,1
(ξ1 + λn)2
+
u2n,2
(ξ2 + λn)2
= 1 (22)
Proof: An optimal Lagrange multiplier always exists
for (19), as the linear independence constraint qualification
holds [36, Sec. 3.1]. The Lagrangian function of (19) is
L(γn, λn) = (z
atk
n −Anγn)>Σ−1n (zatkn −Anγn)+
+ λn(γ
>
n γn − 1). (23)
The optimality condition that yields γn as a function of λn is
given by ∇γnL(γn, λn) = 0, which yields
(A>nΣ
−1
n An + λnI)γn = A
>
nΣ
−1
n z
atk
n . (24)
Assuming the invertibility of (A>nΣ
−1
n An+λnI)—which will
be discussed shortly—(21) is obtained.
To find λn, substitute (21) into the constraint γ>n γn = 1.
This yields the equation g(λn) = 1 where
g(λn) = z
atk
n
>
Σ−1n An(A
>
nΣ
−1
n An + λnI)
−2A>nΣ
−1
n z
atk
n .
The function g(λn) can be written in the following simpler
form if A>nΣ
−1
n An is substituted by its EVD QΞQ
>:
g(λn) = u
>
n (Ξ + λnI)
−2un (25)
Eq. (22) is obtained by expanding (25).
The function g(λn) is strictly decreasing in λn in inter-
val [−min{ξ1, ξ2},∞). Moreover, the limit of g(λn) as λn
approaches −min{ξ1, ξ2} or +∞ is respectively +∞ or 0,
therefore, the equation g(λn) = 1 has one real root in the
interval [−min{ξ1, ξ2},∞).
Eq. (22) is quartic in λn, that is, it yields four values of λn
as solutions. The solutions of a quartic equation are completely
characterized and can be routinely computed; see e.g., [37].
In addition, Theorem 3 ensures that at least one real solution
exists, i.e., a situation where (22) has only complex roots never
arises. The optimal value of λn is obtained by substituting each
value of λn first in (21), and then picking the one that yields
the smallest objective in (19). Algorithm 3 summarizes the
steps to solve (17).
The previous procedure works seamlessly, unless
A>nΣ
−1
n An + λnI is not invertible, which is unlikely
in practice, as explained next. In particular, the following
theorem characterizes the invertibility of A>nΣ
−1
n An + λnI.
Theorem 4: The matrix A>nΣ
−1
n An+λnI in (21) is invert-
ible if un,1 6= 0 or un,2 6= 0.
Proof: We will prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose
that the matrix A>nΣ
−1
n An + λnI is not invertible. Then, the
optimal Lagrange multiplier λn is −ξ1 or −ξ2.
Using the EVD of A>nΣ
−1
n An, (24) is written as
(Ξ + λnI)Q
>γn = un (26)
If λn = −ξ1, (26) takes the form
[
0 0
0 ξ2−ξ1
]
Q>γn =
[ un,1
un,2
]
.
If un,1 6= 0, then the latter system of equations is incompatible.
Thus, if un,1 6= 0, the optimal multiplier cannot be −ξ1. A
similar argument can be followed for λn = −ξ2, which yields[
ξ1−ξ2 0
0 0
]
Q>γn =
[ un,1
un,2
]
.
In practice, it is unlikely that un,1 = 0 or un,2 = 0. The
reason is that un depends on the noisy zatkn (recall that un =
Q>A>nΣ
−1
n z
atk
n ), and thus the noise must have very particular
values in order to yield un,1 = 0 or un,2 = 0. In our numerical
tests, we did not encounter any noninvertibility issue.
Remark 2 (Relationship to works on imperfect synchroniza-
tion): The modeling of GPS spoofing is related to imperfect
PMU synchronization [38], and more broadly to asynchronous
sampling in networked sensing systems [39]. But the GPS
spoofing attack is different than imperfect PMU synchroniza-
tion. In the latter, the measurement delay typically translates to
less than 1◦ for 60 Hz frequency; whereas, in GPS spoofing,
the attacker can potentially cause a much larger phase shift
as documented in Table I. The small phase shift implies that
approximations sin ∆θn ≈ ∆θn and cos ∆θn ≈ 1 can be
invoked to render Γn(∆θn) linear. These approximations are
used in [38]. Problem (16) is more complicated when the
attack angles are not assumed small. This section developed
tractable algorithms for its solution based on the reformula-
tion (17) that includes the nonconvex constraint (17b).
The work in [39] includes a general asynchronicity model,
but relies upon computing the Fourier transform of the under-
lying signal to be estimated. As such, it is necessary to acquire
a number of signal samples across time. On the other hand,
a single set of measurements from all PMUs is sufficient for
the present work. The work [39] also develops an alternating
minimization algorithm. It performs full optimization with
respect to one set of variables, but takes one step of gradient
descent with respect to the other set. On the other hand,
the present work performs full minimizations with respect to
each set of optimization variables, which becomes possible
by exploiting Lagrangian duality and the structure of the
particular problem at hand.
C. Simplifications Under Diagonal Covariance
Suppose that the covariance Σn is a diagonal matrix with
equal variance for the real and imaginary parts of the voltage
and likewise for the real and imaginary parts of every current
on the Ln lines [7], [30], [38]. The covariance is thus assumed
to have diagonal entries σ2n,i, i = 1, . . . ,Mn, where
σn,1 = σn,2, σn,3 = σn,4, . . . , σn,Mn−1 = σn,Mn . (27)
The computation of γn is very simple in this case, as the
following theorem describes.
Theorem 5: The closed-form solution for γn when the
covariance Σn has the structure given by (27) is
γn = (1/||A>nΣ−1n zatkn ||2)A>nΣ−1n zatkn . (28)
8Algorithm 3: State Estimation & Attack Reconstruction
Result: State Estimate vˆAM and Attack Angle
∆θn, n ∈ NPMU
Input: zatkn
Initialization: Solve (18) for vˆAM by setting γn = [1 0]>
repeat
for n ∈ NPMU do
Obtain 4 roots of g(λn) = 1
Find the corresponding γn via (21)
Pick the γn that minimizes (19a)
end
Update vˆAM using (18)
until convergence or maximum iterations reached;
Proof: Under (27), the matrix A>nΣ
−1
n An is written as
A>nΣ
−1
n An = dnI where dn is given by
dn =
Mn−1∑
i=1, i odd
σ−2n,i [(h
>
n,iv)
2 + (h>n,i+1v)
2]. (29)
Substituting A>nΣ
−1
n An = dnI in g(λn) = 1 yields
zatkn
>
Σ−1n An(dnI + λnI)
−2A>nΣ
−1
n z
atk
n = 1
and the solution with respect to λn is given by dn +
λn = ±||A>nΣ−1n zatkn ||2. Substituting the latter into (21),
we obtain two possible values of γn given by γn(λn) =
±A>nΣ−1n zatkn /||A>nΣ−1n zatkn ||2. Substitution into (19) reveals
that only the positive value of γn minimizes (19).
The advantage of the diagonal covariance Σn is that there
is no need to solve the quartic equation (22) in order to obtain
γn, which simplifies the computation in Algorithm 3.
The analyses of Sections IV and V can be extended to SE
with both PMU and SCADA measurements as explained next.
VI. EXTENSIONS TO SE WITH PMU AND SCADA
MEASUREMENTS
PMUs have higher sampling rates than SCADA (0.008–
0.03 sec compared to 2–4 sec) [40]. Consequently, combined
SCADA and PMU measurements can increase the accuracy of
SE [8, Sec. III-C]. State estimation with combined measure-
ments is also referred to as hybrid SE. This section focuses
on hybrid SE where SCADA measurements can be used
as pseudo-measurements to provide a rough estimate of the
system state, which can then be used with PMU measurement
for more accurate state estimation [41]. An overview of the
hybrid SE is provided next, followed by the related analysis
under GPS spoofing.
Due to the quadratic relation between the SCADA mea-
surements and the state vector, the state vector can only be
recovered up to a phase rotation [30]. To overcome this phase
ambiguity issue in hybrid SE, as discussed in [30], a PMU
is installed at reference bus, and furthermore, the phase of
the reference bus is equivalently considered to be zero and
removed from the state vector. In rectangular coordinates,
V1,i is hence set to zero and removed from the state vector.
Thus, the dimension of v is reduced to (2Nb − 1) × 1, and
consequently, the (Nb + 1)th column (row) is removed from
the Hn (G) matrix in the linear model of Section III involving
PMU measurements.
The SCADA measurement model is
zs = h(v) + ws (30)
where zs ∈ RM is the SCADA measurement vector, a nonlin-
ear function h : R2Nb−1 → RM relates the state vector v to
the measurement vector zs, and the noise vector is distributed
according to ws ∼ N (0,Σe), where Σe is a known positive
definite covariance matrix of the SCADA measurements. The
SCADA state estimate vˆs is typically obtained by solving the
nonlinear least squares minv(zs−h(v))>Σ−1e (zs−h(v)) via
the Gauss-Newton method. Upon convergence, the covariance
of vˆs can be approximated as follows [30]:
Σs =
(
J>(vˆs)Σ−1e J(vˆs)
)−1
(31)
where J(v) = ∇vh(v) is the Mn×(2Nb−1) Jacobian matrix
of h(v).
Hybrid SE can be cast in a Bayesian framework, where
SCADA measurements are used to provide prior estimates vˆs,
which in turn are normally distributed with covariance Σs
given previously. The state estimate in the Bayesian framework
is obtained from the maximum a posteriori (MAP) probability
criterion:
vˆMAP = argmin
v
Nb∑
n=1
an(zn −Hnv)>Σ−1n (zn −Hnv)
+ (v − vˆs)>Σ−1s (v − vˆs). (32)
The last term in (32) is a regularizer that attracts the solution
towards vˆs, depending on how much the prior estimate is
trusted, which is determined by Σ−1s . The closed form solution
vˆMAP is derived similarly to vˆML. The MAP estimate is
Gaussian distributed, that is, vˆMAP ∼ N (v,G−1p ), where
Gp = G+Σ
−1
s is the regularized gain matrix and G is given
previously.
The state estimate using the MAP estimator with SCADA
priors and corrupted measurement is given by
vˆatkMAP = G
−1
p
(
Nb∑
n=1
anH
>
nΣ
−1
n z
atk
n + Σ
−1
s vˆs
)
. (33)
The statistics of (33) are given in [17], where it is observed
that the attack introduces estimation bias.
The analyses performed in Sections IV and V can be
easily extended to the case where both PMU and SCADA
measurements are used for SE. In Section IV, BML should be
replaced by BMAP, given in [17, eq. (23)], to find the most
vulnerable PMU in the network. Similarly, an AM algorithm
as in Section V can be applied to combined PMU and SCADA
measurements. In particular, the γn update for combined PMU
and SCADA measurements is given by the solution to (19),
9Algorithm 4: State Estimation & Attack Reconstruction
for Combined PMU and SCADA Measurements
Result: State Estimate vˆAM and Attack Angle
∆θn, n ∈ NPMU
Inputs: zatkn and SCADA-based estimate vˆs
Initialization: Solve (34) for vˆAM by setting γn = [1 0]>
repeat
for n ∈ NPMU do
Obtain 4 roots of g(λn) = 1
Find the corresponding γn via (21)
Pick the γn that minimizes (19a)
end
Update vˆAM using (34)
until convergence or maximum iterations reached;
TABLE II
OPTIMAL PMU LOCATION (a) FOR IEEE TEST NETWORKS.
Test Case |NPMU| Bus number
IEEE 14 6 2,4,6,7,10,14
IEEE 30 13 2,3,6,10,11,12,15,20,23,25,27,28,29
IEEE 118 94
1–5,7–19,21–25,27–36,40,43,44,46,47,48,
50,51,52,53,55–60,64,65,66,67,68,70,71,73,75,76,
77,80–83,85–90,92,94–104,106–111,113–118
because the regularizer in (32) does not contain γn. To update
vˆAM, (18) is replaced by the following equation:
vˆAM = (GAM + Σ
−1
s )
−1
·
(
Nb∑
n=1
an(ΓHn)
>Σ−1n z
atk
n + Σ
−1
s vˆs
)
. (34)
The alternating minimization steps are summarized in Algo-
rithm 4.
VII. NUMERICAL TESTS
This section presents numerical tests for identification of
vulnerable PMU locations (Section VII-A) as well as for the
state and attack angle estimation using the AM algorithm (Sec-
tions VII-B and VII-C). Sections VII-D and VII-E compare
the performance of the AM algorithm with a bad data detector
and with the work in [24], respectively. All tests are performed
on the IEEE 14-, 30-, and 118-bus networks. All network
parameters are provided in case files case14.m, case30.m,
and case118.m of MATPOWER [42], from which Hn’s are
computed. The PMU placement vector a for all test cases is
obtained using the criterion in [30, eq. (7)] via YALMIP [43],
based exclusively on the availability of PMU measurements
(i.e., setting Σ−1s = 0). Table II lists the buses with installed
PMUs for each network. The noise covariance Σn is diagonal
resulting from standard deviation of 0.01 and 0.02 for bus
voltage and line current measurements respectively.
A. Vulnerable PMU Location
We solve (14) for different network loads ranging from
50% to 150% of the nominal demand given in MATPOWER
case files. Specifically, we calculate the corresponding voltage
TABLE III
MOST VULNERABLE PMU BUS LOCATION FOR IEEE TEST NETWORKS
USING (CASE A) NOMINAL DEMAND, (CASE B) 50% OF NOMINAL
DEMAND, AND (CASE C) 150% OF NOMINAL DEMAND.
Test Case Bus [case (a)] Bus [case (b)] Bus [case (c)]
IEEE 14 6 6 6
IEEE 30 12 12 12
IEEE 118 30 30 68
TABLE IV
VULNERABLE PMU BUS LOCATIONS FOR ATTACK ON 2 PMUS USING
GREEDY AND OPTIMAL ALGORITHMS.
Test Case Algorithm 1 (Optimal) Algorithm 2 (Greedy)
1st PMU 2nd PMU 1st PMU 2nd PMU
IEEE 14 6 7 6 7
IEEE 30 12 15 12 15
IEEE 118 –* –* 30 40
* Computation for 118-bus system was terminated after 48 hours.
profile v resulting from 50% to 150% of the nominal real
and reactive power demand using MATPOWER’s runpf.
Table III lists the most vulnerable PMU location for an attack
on one PMU.
Furthermore, a simultaneous attack on two PMUs is an-
alyzed. The results of Algorithms 1 and 2 are compared.
Table IV indicates that Algorithms 1 and 2 give the same
results for the IEEE 14- and 30-bus systems.
It is important to note the difference in computation time
between Algorithms 1 and 2. The difference is more apparent
in the 118-bus network than in the 14-bus network, so we
report the computation times for the former.3 Specifically, for
simultaneous attack on two PMUs in the 118-bus system,
Algorithm 2 takes 2 hours and 10 minutes. On the other hand,
Algorithm 1 required more than 48 hours to solve the total of
( 1182 ) nonconvex problems, and the execution was terminated
at 48 hours. Thus, Algorithm 2 is computationally efficient.
B. SE and Attack Reconstruction with PMU Measurements
As described in Section V, zatkn is the input to the AM
algorithm. The vector zatkn is generated according to (5), where
v is the voltage profile corresponding to nominal network
demand obtained from MATPOWER’s runpf; ∆θ is an
attack vector which is varied as explained next; and noise
vector wn is a sample from the Gaussian distribution with
zero mean and covariance Σn given earlier. This renders
zatkn random in each run of the algorithm. One realization
of zatkn with attack on buses 6 and 14 and attack angles
∆θ6 = 30
◦ and ∆θ14 = 45◦ is used to generate Fig. 1.
Tolerance  = 0.01 was used in the termination criterion
|CurrObj− PrevObj|/|CurrObj| ≤ . The figure depicts
the estimated state (voltage magnitude and phase) as well as
reconstructed attack for the IEEE 14-bus network. The figure
reveals that the state is correctly estimated, and the attacked
buses are identified, together with the attack angle. Notice that
3The algorithms were run on an Intel Xeon E5-1650 v2, 3.5-GHz CPU,
16-GB RAM computer.
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Fig. 1. IEEE 14-bus test case: Estimated state (voltage magnitude and phase) and reconstructed attack for attack on two PMUs. (a) True and estimated voltage
magnitude. (b) True and estimated voltage phase angle. (c) True and estimated attack angle.
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Fig. 2. State accuracy for an attack
on one PMU as a function of hourly
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Fig. 3. Comparison between the true
and estimated attack angle as a func-
tion of hourly demand in a standard
IEEE-118 bus network.
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tive value as a function of number
of iterations for IEEE-118 system.
the estimated attack angle is almost zero for PMU buses that
are not attacked.
Fig. 2 depicts the state accuracy for an attack on the PMU
installed on bus 5 as a function of the hourly demand in the
IEEE 118-bus network, where the state accuracy is defined as√
(Vˆn,r − Vn,r)2 + (Vˆn,i − Vn,i)2. In addition to bus 5, the
state accuracy for buses connected to the attacked bus 5 is
also plotted. For this test, the November weekday 24-hour
demand from [44] is normalized to 1.5 and is used to scale
the nominal demand of the IEEE-118 network, from which v
is obtained. Attack ranging from 0◦ to 180◦ is simulated in the
time interval of 2 through 11 hours and 14 through 23 hours.
Fig. 3 shows the comparison between the true and estimated
attack angle for each hour.
Fig. 4 depicts the relative error of the state and attack angle
estimates as a function of the percentage of PMUs attacked.
The relative state and attack angle estimation errors are defined
respectively as ||vˆ−v||2||v||2 and
||∆̂θ−∆θ||2
||∆θ||2 , where vˆ and ∆̂θ
represent the state and attack angle vector resulting from
Algorithm 3, while v and ∆θ represent their true values. For
each percentage of attacked PMUs, the relative error averaged
over 100 samples of zatkn is depicted. Each realization of z
atk
n
entails a random noise sample, a random set of attacked PMUs
for the given percentage, and a random attack angle chosen
from a uniform distribution in the interval [−60◦, 60◦]. The
voltage profile v resulting from the nominal demand in the
IEEE-118 network and tolerance of 0.01 are used. Fig. 4
reveals that the relative state estimation error is below 1%
even when 20% of PMUs are attacked.
C. SE and Attack Reconstruction with SCADA and PMU
Measurements
As described in Section VI, the AM algorithm can be
applied to perform the state estimation and attack angle
reconstruction with combined PMU and SCADA measure-
ments. MATPOWER’s run_se.m is used to obtain vˆs. The
redundancy ratio for SCADA measurements, which is the ratio
of SCADA measurements over the state variables is 2.2 [45].
The SCADA measurements include active and reactive line
power flows through “from” and “to” ends of the bus, and
bus voltage magnitudes. For the purpose of this simulation,
50% of all bus voltage magnitudes and active and reactive line
power flows are considered as SCADA measurements, which
approximately equals the redundancy ratio. These remain fixed
throughout the experiment. The PMU placement is according
to Table II, with an additional PMU placed at the slack bus
for each network. In order to obtain the relative error, for each
network, PMUs on two buses are attacked.
The SCADA measurement noise covariance matrix Σe is
diagonal resulting from standard deviation of 0.01 and 0.02
for bus voltage magnitude and line power flows (to and from)
respectively. The matrix Σs is given by (31) and obtained from
run_se.m.4
The input to the AM algorithm is zatkn , which is random
due to noise vector wn ∼ N (0,Σn) in the PMU measurement
and noise vector ws ∼ N (0,Σe) in the SCADA measurement
4MATPOWER’s run_se.m is not considering the measurement from the
reference bus as unknown for the state estimation; hence, the dimension of Σs
returned from run_se.m is (2Nb−2)×(2Nb−2). However, the dimension
of Σs, as described in Section VI, is (2Nb − 1) × (2Nb − 1). Thus, we
augment Σ−1s returned from run_se.m by one row and one column with
a single non-zero entry corresponding to V1,r . This entry is set to a value
greater in absolute value than the maximum of the remaining entries in Σ−1s
(approximately 108 here).
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TABLE V
RELATIVE STATE AND ATTACK ANGLE (A. A.) ESTIMATION ERRORS FOR
STANDARD TEST NETWORKS USING PMU, PMU + SCADA, AND
REDUCED PMU + SCADA MEASUREMENTS.
Test Case
Only PMU PMU + SCADA Reduced + SCADA
PMU
State A. A. State A. A. State A. A.
IEEE 14 0.0210 0.0577 0.0055 0.0258 0.0066 0.0202
IEEE 30 0.0970 0.3727 0.0091 0.0519 0.0103 0.0379
IEEE 118 0.0073 0.1213 0.0010 0.0938 0.0013 0.0689
vector. Thus, the relative error is averaged over 100 realiza-
tions of zatkn . Tolerance of 0.01 was used for the AM algorithm.
Table V lists the relative state and attack angle estimation
errors for the standard test networks in three scenarios. In
the first scenario, no SCADA measurements are used. This
case is indicated in Table V as “only PMU.” For the “only
PMU” scenario, the attacks on the IEEE 14-, 30-, and 118-
bus networks are respectively on the PMUs at buses 6 and
14 (∆θ6 = 30◦, ∆θ14 = 45◦), 6 and 12 (∆θ6 = 30◦,
∆θ12 = 45
◦), and 36 and 50 (∆θ36 = 30◦, ∆θ50 = 45◦).
Along with the SCADA measurements, the second scenario
utilizes all the PMUs depicted in Table II (in addition to
the slack bus). This case is indicated in Table V as “PMU
+ SCADA.” For the “PMU + SCADA” scenario, the attacks
on the IEEE 14-, 30-, and 118-bus networks are respectively
on the PMUs at buses 6 and 14 (∆θ6 = 30◦, ∆θ14 = 45◦), 12
and 15 (∆θ12 = 30◦, ∆θ15 = 45◦), and 5 and 8 (∆θ5 = 30◦,
∆θ8 = 45
◦). In the third scenario, few PMUs are chosen at
random for each network from Table II; the purpose is to make
the corresponding network unobservable (i.e., a singular G)
in the absence of SCADA measurements. Hence, this scenario
includes the measurements from the reduced set of PMUs and
SCADA measurements. This case is indicated in Table V as
“Reduced PMU + SCADA.”
It is evident from Table V that combining PMU and SCADA
measurements increases the accuracy of the AM algorithm.
Table V also indicates that in the Reduced PMU + SCADA
scenario, more accurate results are obtained than in the Only
PMU scenario.
D. Comparision between Algorithm 3 and the LNRT
In power systems, bad data can arise from multiple
sources such as corrupted meter measurements, communica-
tion failures, and parameter uncertainty. This section examines
whether a classical bad data detector can identify the GPS-
spoofed PMU measurements and return a highly accurate
state estimate. The LNRT is selected to this end, which is
capable to detect and identify bad data from the measurement
residuals, as opposed to the chi-square test, which can detect
the presence of bad data, but not identify their locations.
To streamline the notation, the measurement equation for
LNRT is z = Hv + w, where z and H are formed by
stacking {zn}n∈NPMU and {Hn}n∈NPMU respectively. Further-
more, the noise w has a block diagonal covariance ma-
trix Σ with diagonal blocks {Σn}n∈NPMU . The residual of
the measurement vector is given by r = z − Hvˆ where
TABLE VI
RELATIVE STATE ESTIMATION ERRORS FOR STANDARD TEST NETWORKS
USING ALGORITHM 3 AND THE LNRT.
Test Case Attack on One PMU Attack on two PMUsAlgorithm 3 LNRT Algorithm 3 LNRT
IEEE 14 0.0142 0.0531 0.0145 0.1536
IEEE 30 0.0469 0.0539 0.0566 0.0835
IEEE 118 0.0039 0.0054 0.0039 0.0057
vˆ = (H>Σ−1H)−1H>Σ−1z is computed via weighted
least squares. The LNRT uses the residual statistics to detect
and identify bad data. In particular, the residual vector has
distribution r ∼ N (0,Ω), where Ω = SΣ and S = I −
H(H>Σ−1H)−1HΣ−1.
The LNRT uses the weighted least squares to obtain the
state estimate (vˆ) and measurement residual (r). It utilizes the
normalized measurement residuals to identify bad data. The
normalized residual rnormalized = r/
√
Ωi,i should follow the
standard normal distribution for all i when bad data are absent.
If rnormalized is larger than a threshold, chosen here as 3 [29,
Sec. 4.8.4], then the particular measurement is removed.5 Then
the least squares solution is re-computed, and the process
continues until all bad data have been removed.
In this experiment, PMUs are placed as listed in Table II,
and the AM algorithm as well as the LNRT are run on
200 realizations of zatkn . Tolerance of 0.0001 was used for
Algorithm 3. For the IEEE 14-, 30-, and 118-bus networks,
the attacks are respectively on the PMUs at buses 2 and 14
(∆θ2 = 60◦, ∆θ14 = 70◦), 11 and 12 (∆θ11 = 70◦, ∆θ12 =
60◦), and 64 and 2 (∆θ64 = 70◦, ∆θ2 = 70◦). Note that the
GPS-spoofing attack not only affects the voltage measurement
at the attacked bus but also the current measurements flowing
on the lines connected to the attacked bus. Our observation
is that the LNRT can identify the voltage and some of the
current measurements corresponding to the attacked bus as
bad, but in many cases, it cannot identify all affected current
measurements.
Table VI compares the relative state error (averaged over
the 200 realizations) returned by Algorithm 3 and by LNRT.
Although LNRT removes multiple bad measurements, it can
be observed from Table VI that Algorithm 3 produces more
accurate results than these obtained from LNRT. These tests
indicate the strength of the novel AM algorithm. Table VII
compares the computation time of Algorithm 3 and LNRT for
the standard test networks.6 It is finally worth noting that the
AM algorithm can also yield relatively accurate estimates of
the attack angles, contrary to LNRT.
E. Comparision between Algorithm 3 and the Spoofing-
Matched Algorithm (SpM)
The spoofing-matched algorithm (SpM) is developed
in [24], where it is demonstrated to successfully detect and
5Critical measurements are not removed, because elimination of a critical
measurement would render the system unobservable.
6The system specifications for the computation times of Tables VII and IX
are as follows: Intel Xeon E3-1271 v3, 3.6-GHz CPU, 32-GB RAM. The
computation times include averaging over the 200 realizations.
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TABLE VII
COMPUTATION TIME (IN SECONDS) FOR ALGORITHM 3 AND THE LNRT
IN STANDARD TEST NETWORKS.
Test Case Attack on One PMU Attack on two PMUsAlgorithm 3 LNRT Algorithm 3 LNRT
IEEE 14 6.8063 0.7324 8.4220 0.9419
IEEE 30 49.5106 0.9430 91.6521 1.9756
IEEE 118 95.8400 106.4569 102.8687 150.6190
TABLE VIII
RELATIVE STATE AND ATTACK ANGLE (A. A.) ESTIMATION ERRORS FOR
STANDARD TEST NETWORKS USING ALGORITHM 3 AND THE SPM.
Test Case Algorithm 3 SpMState A.A. State A.A.
IEEE 14 0.0143 0.0172 0.2875 0.7187
IEEE 30 0.0550 0.0904 0.1226 0.7087
IEEE 118 0.0038 0.0427 0.0170 0.7072
TABLE IX
COMPUTATION TIME (IN SECONDS) FOR ALGORITHM 3 AND THE SPM
ALGORITHM IN STANDARD TEST NETWORKS.
Test Case Algorithm 3 SpM
IEEE 14 9.0527 8.4909
IEEE 30 110.5931 45.0878
IEEE 118 91.3241 1.2191·104
correct a single GPS spoofing attack. In this section, we
compare the performance of Algorithm 3 with SpM under
attacks on two PMUs.
In this experiment, two PMUs from each network listed
in Table II are attacked. For the IEEE 14-, 30-, and 118-bus
networks, the attacks are respectively on the PMUs at buses
6 and 7 (∆θ6 = ∆θ7 = 90◦), 6 and 10 (∆θ6 = ∆θ10 =
90◦), and 3 and 4 (∆θ3 = ∆θ4 = 90◦). The AM algorithm
as well as the SpM are run on 200 realizations of zatkn . The
tolerance is set to 0.0001 for Algorithm 3. The SpM algorithm
utilizes the golden section search algorithm [46, Chapter 7]
to determine the estimate of the GPS spoofed attack angle.
The accuracy of the golden section algorithm depends on the
difference between the lower and upper bound of an interval.
In other words, if the the difference is less than the desired
tolerance, convergence is declared. Here, the tolerance of the
golden section algorithm is set to 10−5.
Table VIII summarizes the performance of both algorithms.
The table shows that in terms of relative state and attack angle
estimation errors, Algorithm 3 performs better than SpM.
Finally, Table IX compares the computation time between
Algorithm 3 and SpM for the standard test networks. Note that
the computation times of Algorithm 3 reported in Tables VII
and IX are slightly different because the attack locations and
angles are different between the two experiments.
VIII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we build on the novel measurement model
developed in [17] to formulate an optimization problem to
identify the most vulnerable PMUs in the network. A greedy
algorithm is developed to approximately solve the aforemen-
tioned problem. The problem of jointly estimating the network
state and reconstructing the attack is cast as a nonconvex
constrained least squares problem, and an alternating mini-
mization algorithm is developed for its solution. Thorough
numerical tests are performed to compare the performance
of the developed algorithms (in terms of accuracy, detection,
and computational time) with other state-of-the-art methods.
Numerical tests illustrate the potential of the developed algo-
rithms in this paper.
Building on the developed approach in this paper, it is of
interest to perform simultaneous extraction of the attack and
dynamic state estimation. We plan to utilize dynamic observers
for nonlinear systems with time-delays to this end.
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